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NOTES
REFORMING FEDERAL GRAZING LAW: WILL
CONGRESS PASS NEEDED LEGISLATION
BEFORE THE COWS COME HOME?
INTRODUCTION
Thousands of ranchers throughout the western United States graze their
sheep and cattle on federal lands. The vast majority of these lands belong to
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, which lease the
public land and allocate the available grazing rights among the ranchers.'
For many of these ranchers, grazing on federal lands makes cattle ranching
a viable livelihood. Western ranchers support the current federal law that
maintains low grazing fees while conservationists believe the lands are overgrazed, causing damage to public lands and harm to wildlife. Conservationists claim that the federal government subsidizes ranchers with low user
fees and advocate increasing public grazing fees to a level comparable to
private grazing fees. In addition, internal program budget deficits and national budget considerations create additional problems for governments
struggling with the grazing programs.
A draft bill circulated in Congress in 1985 attempted to resolve the current problems of the federal grazing program. This note analyzes the grazing issues presented in that bill and suggests that Congress should pass the
draft version of the bill, the Public Rangelands Policy Amendments Act of
1985 (PRPAA).2 While supporting most sections of the PRPAA, the note
points out the crucial issue of grazing fees which the proposed bill fails to
address and proposes several amendments to the PRPAA that will protect
our natural resources, yet not endanger the rancher of the American West.
The note first examines the history and structure of private grazing on public lands and the views of those involved in the debate. It then examines the
PRPAA and concludes by proposing amendments that would strengthen
the Act.
HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL
GRAZING LANDS
Private grazing on federal lands began in the late nineteenth century. As
the West 3 was settled, the federal government made little effort to regulate
I.

2.
3.

The Forest Service owns 192 million acres and the Bureau of Land Management about 200 million
acres, most of which is in the western third of the United States. This is roughly half of the land in
the West. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984 10-22 (1985) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984).
Relevant provisions of the PRPAA are located infra at appendix.
"The West," as used in this note, includes the 11 westernmost states in the continental United
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use of unsettled areas.4 Indeed, the federal government gave away lands at a
tremendous rate:' 328 million acres to the states,6 94 million acres to the
railroads,7 287.5 million acres to homesteaders and ranchers, 8 and 440 million acres for other purposes, including military bounties, mining claims,
and outright sale. 9 These groups generally left the less productive mountainous and arid land unclaimed.' 0 These unwanted lands became today's
public lands, currently grazed by privately owned sheep and cattle in accord with federal law."
As the West grew, ranchers moved their herds from the more fertile
plains and valley bottoms to less desirable areas in the mountains and
deserts to provide supplemental forage for herds and to relieve pressure on
the ranchers' already overgrazed claims.' 2 In the 1890s, Congress recog-

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

States, which are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Reference to 16 western states adds Kansas, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota to the above list. These states contain the overwhelming
majority of land owned by the federal government. Some statutes governing federal grazing law
include only the first 11 states. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1702(o) (1982). Others, like the Public Rangelands Improvements Act of
1978 (PRIA), 43 U.S.C. § 1902(i) (1982), cover 16 states.
The federal government encouraged the taking of unclaimed land for private use. In Buford v.
Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890), the Supreme Court granted access to public lands without regard to
the claims of private landowners. These and other legislative and judicial actions encouraged the
haphazard settlement of the West and created many of the problems facing the livestock industry
today. See Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I The Extent and Distribution of
Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Coggins I]. The series of five articles
by Professor Coggins thoroughly reviews federal grazing law and policy. The other articles are The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Coggins II]; A Survey of
Creeping Regulation at the Periphery, 1934-1982, 13 ENVTL. L. 295 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Coggins III]; FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Coggins IV]; and Prescriptionsfor Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Coggins V]. For the classic study on the public grazing system, see P. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS
(1960).
The government gave away an estimated 1.2 billion acres of federal land. P. CULHANE, PUBLIC
LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BLM 44-45
(1981). Other statistics show government disposal of 1.1 billion acres and current holdings of 738
million acres. See M. CLAWSON, THE PUBLIC LANDS REVISITED 26 (1983).
The states received this land for many purposes and in a variety of allotments. The purposes included support of schools, funding for land grant colleges, and transportation corridors. The federal government continues to recognize state claims totaling 571,000 acres. PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 5. Some of these lands are leased by the states for livestock
grazing.
Id. The railroads received alternating sections along the right of way, creating access and management difficulties for the alternate section owners. While the railroad grants encouraged settlement
of the West and made grazing possible, the problems created by the checkerboard pattern of land
ownership continue today. The federal government frequently owns the other lands. These
problems are being solved through land swaps between the federal and state governments and
private land owners, but this is a slow and cumbersome activity. See Coggins II, supra note 4, at
11-14.
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 5. Some of the land claimed by homesteaders
and ranchers was abandoned and reclaimed by later settlers. Coggins II, supra note 4, at 21.
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 5.
Average BLM land requires 15 acres to support one cow for one month. Some areas require 640
acres (one square mile) for each cow each year. Nelson, Economic Analysis of Public Rangeland
Management, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS 70 (1984).
Even though sheep also graze on federal grazing lands, this note will refer only to cattle. The
government equates five sheep for each cow when determining carrying capacity. While the
number of sheep and cattle grazed on public land are about the same, cattle occupy six times more
animal unit months of use. Roughly 2000 of the 20,000 BLM permits and leases are held by sheep
owners.
The West experienced a use explosion in the 1870s and 1880s. Millions of cattle roamed unherded
and unfenced until rounded up in the spring and fall for branding and sale. The winter of 1887-88
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nized the growing threat to America's forests and created the Forest Service
to protect federal timberlands from lumberjacks and ranchers.' 3 In 1934,
Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act' 4 and established the General
Land Office to protect the remaining unclaimed land, which consisted primarily of arid plains. This office later became the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).' 5 Congress delegated to the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior the power to divide, manage, and regulate these lands.' 6 As early as
1934 the present federal grazing system was operational.
The federal government, through its rule-making authority,1 7 has created a lease and permit system for grazing on the public lands. Each BLM
district and Forest Service National Forest headquarters has divided the
suitable areas within their territory into grazing allotments.' 8 The grazing
administrator, with the advice of the district grazing advisory boards, determines the number of animals that each specific tract can support and any
necessary rehabilitation and improvements to the land.' 9 The tracts are offered for permit use or lease,2" with leasing priority generally determined by

13.

14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

killed millions of cattle after a summer drought had damaged the already overgrazed plains, dealing a devestating blow to the West that stimulated federal intervention. See Coggins II, supra note
4, at 22-23. See also W. VOIGHT, PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY AND
GOVERNMENT 29-30 (1976). For one state's experience of these times, see K. TOOLE, MONTANA,
AN UNCOMMON LAND 139-53 (1959).
Created in 1897, the Forest Service is an independent agency of the Department of Agriculture. Its
purpose is to establish, control, and administer public forests for public benfit and use. 16 U.S.C.
§ 475 (1982). The Forest Service first instituted fees for grazing in 1906. These fees averaged $0.05
per animal unit month. The Forest Service did not use a fixed rate, but rather used local factors in
determining what each rancher should pay. See A. BACKIEL, FEDERAL GRAZING FEES ON LANDS
ADMINISTERED BY THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THE FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY OF LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES 3 (1985).
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1982).
Originally known as the Division of Grazing, the government renamed it the Grazing Service in
1939, and in 1946 consolidated it with the General Land Office to form the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The Taylor Act ended all homesteading by withdrawing all unclaimed federal
land from disposal to the public. P. CULHANE, supra note 5, at 81-89. See Coggins II, supra note 4,
at 40-60.
16 U.S.C. § 5801 (1982). This statute authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate grazing on
the lands administered by him, which includes the National Forests and the National Grasslands,
and to regulate the terms and conditions of the permits granted for grazing. The Secretary of
Interior has authority to regulate similar activities. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5), 1740 (1982). The regulations governing BLM grazing are located at 43
C.F.R. §§ 4000-4170 (1985) and the Forest Service grazing regulations are located at 36 C.F.R.
§§ 222.1-.11, .50-.53 (1985).
There are 57 BLM district offices in the western United States. One intermediate supervisor is
located in each of the 11 western states. The Forest Service has seven regional foresters, and one
grazing district, supervised by a ranger, for each of the National Forests in the West. See P.
CULHANE, supra note 5, at 60-65, 97-105.
43 U.S.C. § 1753(a)-(b) (1982). The number of animals that each tract can support is its "carrying
capacity." This is the figure used when determining fees and is often the essential negotiating term
when renewing leases. Rehabilitation may mean seeding and fencing off barren areas, repairing
gates and fences, installing gates, fences, wells and any other activity needed to support livestock
grazing on the land. Ranchers usually attempt to run as many cattle as possible on a tract to
make operations cost efficient and sometimes agree to increased rehabilitation duties to receive an
increased carrying capacity.
Grazing leases, as defined at 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1985), include isolated and disconnected tracts
of the public domain as defined in § 15 of the Taylor Grazing Act (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315m
(1982)). Grazing permits, as defined at 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1985), include those lands within
grazing districts as defined by § 3 of the Taylor Act (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1982)). All
recent laws and regulations refer to both permits and leases. These terms have little practical difference in meanings. This note uses both although slight variations in their nature, such as disbursement of collected fees, may in fact exist. See infra note 154.
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prior use or adjacent land ownership. 2 Access to land with attached grazing permits has a tangible value pledgeable as security for a loan 22 or as part
of a tract's market value. 23 The permit holders, however, receive no right,
title, or interest in the land,24 but they may sell or devise their permits to
qualified persons.2 5
The system bases fees upon the tracts "carrying capacity" 26 multiplied
by the number of months that capacity will be carried, multiplied by the fee
created by the grazing formula. 27 The user must pay fees in full before the
29
grazing season begins28 and refunds for under-use or non-use are available
3
°
if certain conditions are met. Leaseholders must file a variety of reports
and applications to continue using public lands.3 " Administrative, civil, and
criminal penalties result from the violation of these regulations.3 2
Debate over the current grazing system has centered on several areas:
fee levels, grazing capacity, budget deficits, and alleged rancher domination
of the decision-making process.3 3 Despite many challenges and calls for re21.

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

31.

32.

33.

Other criteria include proper range management and use of water, general needs of the applicant's
livestock operations, public access, and other land use requirements of that situation. 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4110.2-2(b), 4130.1-2(a) to (e) (1985). Use is for 10 years and confers priority in renewal proceedings. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(c)-(d) (1985). The regulations confer the priority if the lessee/permittee has complied with the rules, will accept any new terms to the lease and if the administrator
allows the land to remain open for grazing. Id.
43 C.F.R. § 4130.8 (1985).
The permits have an intangible market value that is a very important part of sales of ranches
appurtenant to the permits. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-3 (1985). Because the permits may be transferred
to another qualified livestock operator, the value of the land to which they are attached is increased. This fact increases both the mortgage costs and the market value of the land beyond what
would be considered normal for grazing land. Ganzel, Maximizing Public Land Resale Values, in
WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS 13 (1984). See also Reid, Gramm, Rudman and Nieslanik, WASH. POST
NAT'L WEEKLY EDITION, Feb. 17, 1986, at 32.
43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(b) (1985).
43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-3 (1985).
See supra note 19.
43 C.F.R. § 4130.7-1(a) to (b) (1985).
43 C.F.R. § 4130.5-1(d) (1985). The rancher can pay fees after the season if he uses an allotment
management plan or cooperative management agreement. These necessitate more paperwork, negotiations and drafting time. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.7-1(d) (1985).
43 C.F.R. § 4130.7-2(b) (1985).
43 C.F.R. § 4130.7-1(d) (1985). Refunds are generally available if prior arrangements have been
made or if administratively declared emergencies exist. These activities create more paperwork and
require active management of the federal lands.
Most activities relating to the public rangelands require a report or form. A partial list of the forms
required to hold public grazing permits would include the following. A person must qualify for
base property certification to bid for public grazing land. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1985). The rancher
must file range improvement permit applications and enter into a cooperative agreement with the
BLM before the rancher can make range improvements. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-1 (1985). Transfer of
grazing preferences requires filing for transfer and the application for new permits or leases. 43
C.F.R. § 4110.2-3 (1985). The rancher must file a certified annual use report within 15 days of the
end of the grazing season. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-2(d) (1985). Failure to comply with these and the
other reporting and filing requirements may result in administrative penalties that include withheld, suspended, or revoked grazing privileges. 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1(a) to (b) (1985).
43 C.F.R. §§ 4140-4170 (1985). The failure to use, overuse of allotments, fraud or misrepresentations in any act connected with the public lands, and damaging government property or the land
are among the illegal acts that permit holders can commit. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1(a)(2),(a)(4)-(5),
(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2)-(4), (b)(8) (1985). Civil penalties include revocation of permits. 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1
(1985). Criminal penalties include fines of up to $1000 and 12 months imprisonment. 43 C.F.R.
§ 4170.2-1,-2 (1985). While these criminal penalties are of a minor nature, the loss of permits often
results in bankruptcy for a rancher dependent on use of federal lands. Threatened revocation
usually ensures compliance with the regulations.
The extensive debates over the public lands and their relationship to the western rancher cannot be
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form,3 4

the system remained relatively unchanged until the mid- 1970s when
a variety of new concerns confronted the federal land system. These concerns included air and water pollution and an increase in recreational use of
federal land.3" In response to these concerns Congress passed the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).3 6 This Act represented the first significant change in federal grazing policy since 1934." 7
The FLPMA attempted to bring order and new policies 38 to a decentralchronicled in this note. For a good history of the subject, see generally Coggins II, III, and IV,
supra note 4.
Adela Backiel provides an outstanding analysis of the history and controversy over the grazing
fee issue. See generally A. BACKIEL, supra note 13. She details the repeated attempts to raise public
fees to comparable private fee levels and the reasons why every attempt to dramatically increase
fees has failed. Backiel uses Alphonse Kerr's famous quote, "the more things change, the more
they remain the same," to summarize the history of the federal grazing system. Id. at 38. See also
W. VOIGHT, supra note 12 (personal history of someone concerned with the abuses of the livestock
industry); M. CLAWSON, supra note 5, at 72 (espousing a belief that the continual fight over grazing fees and related issues indicates that the problem is almost insolvable and that it will "recur
over time").
For a chronological summary of major events in grazing law, see DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE AND INTERIOR, 1985 GRAZING FEE REVIEW AND EVALUATION, DRAFT REPORT 61-62
(1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 DRAFT REPORT].

34.

35.

"The critical factor in natural resources management in the 1970s has been environmentalism. As a
philosophy, environmentalism is a complex blend of progressive conservationism and romantic
preservationism." P. CULHANE, supra note 5, at 55. Professor Coggins describes the "creeping
regulation at the periphery" and the pressures from many different groups that slowly changed the
public outlook and administrator's management policies. Coggins IV, supra note 4, at 307-57.
Backiel suggests that a wider variety of potential users has made federal land laws "more numerous and cumbersome." A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 16.
See W. VOIGHT, supra note 5, at 234-35. The BLM estimates that its lands experienced 59 million
recreation visitor days in 1984. If the BLM implemented a use fee of one dollar per day it would
triple the income collected from grazing fees. The BLM collects only about $700,000 from wildlife
and recreation fees. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1,at 114-115.

36.
37.

Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1982)).
For the general policy trends in public grazing law, see generally Coggins III, supra note 4. "[The]
FLPMA emphatically rejects the grazing-as-dominant-use tradition in public rangeland management in favor of multiple use, sustained yield principals." Coggins IV, supra note 4, at 15. "[T]his
act, more than any other, fundamentally changed the nature of federal policy regarding rangeland." G. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND GRAZING 80

38.

(1981). For a good overview of grazing politics within both the BLM and the Forest Service, see P.
CULHANE, supra note 5, at 45-60, 75-97.
The FLPMA provides:
(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that(2) the national interest will be best realized if the public lands and their resources are
periodically and systematically inventoried and their present and future use is projected
through a land use planning process coordinated with other Federal and State planning
efforts;
(5) in administering public land statutes and exercising discretionary authority
granted to them, the Secretary be required to establish comprehensive rules and regulations
after considering the views of the general public; and to structure adjudication procedures
to assure adequate third party participation, objective administrative review of initial decisions, and expeditious decisionmaking;
(7) goals and objectives be established by law as guidelines for public land use planning, and that management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law;
(9) the United States receive fair market value of the use of the public lands and their
resources unless otherwise provided for by statute.
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
The FLPMA does not set grazing fee levels but directs the Secretaries to determine a fee which
is "equitable to the United States and to the holders of the grazing permits ...." 43 U.S.C.
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ized BLM.3 9 To guide later management decisions the legislation proposed
extensive planning for all grazing districts.' Congress ordered that all subsequent decisions be made under two new guiding policies for public lands:
multiple use 4 ' and sustained yield.42 Congress later supplemented the
FLPMA with the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA).4 3
The PRIA continued the FLPMA's policies," but defined them more pre§ 1751(a) (1982). The Secretaries' formula became the PRIA formula after lengthy discussion on
its merit and structure. See A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 22-31. The importance of the FLPMA
lies not with fee provisions but in the policy change to broader use. The federal law can now
accommodate competing uses and allocate available use among them.
39. One of the chief criticisms of the BLM has been its decentralized structure. District advisory
boards, which have local authority, make the most important decisions in the lives of the permit
holders. State offices have little power, and the central District of Columbia office generally only
makes policy when it must.
The BLM and the Forest Service maintained wholly separate grazing systems until 1978. The
Forest Service implemented multiple use/sustained yield policies after the Multiple-Use, Sustained
Yield Act of 1960. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982). The FLPMA applies only to the BLM. The PRIA
encompasses both the Forest Service and the BLM (43 U.S.C. §§ 1902(a)(5) (1982)), as does the
PRPAA (see infra at appendix).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982). This section directs the BLM to "develop, maintain, and when appropriate, revise land use plans ....
" The statute further designates general criteria to be used in the
planning process, the first of which is to "use and observe the principals of multiple use and sustained yield set forth in this and other applicable law.
... 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1982). Professor
Coggins detected five major themes in the FLPMA, including planning, implementation of multiple use and sustained yield as the basic management standards, protection of environmental standards, encouragement of public participation, and active legislative review of management and
disposition. Coggins IV, supra note 4, at 14.
41. The FLPMA defines "multiple use" as:
[T]he management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are
utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American
people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or
related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of some land for less
than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes
into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable
resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed,
wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values; and harmonious and
coordinated management of the various resources without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration being given
to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that
will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1982).
The FLPMA changed a single user system into a multiple user system. Before FLPMA, the
advisory committee members were only ranchers and the BLM's mandate was to use the lands for
grazing. After FLPMA, the new multiple use committees were established with a variety of nonlivestock industry representatives to oversee the multiple use decision-making process. These
changes obviously disturbed the western livestock rancher and they will fight any further steps
down this path.
42. The FLPMA defines "sustained yield" as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a
high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the public lands
consistent with multiple use." 43 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982). For congressional debate of the FLPMA,
see 122 CONG. REC. 2157-59, 2361-65, 7604-07 (1976). For the legislative history of the FLPMA,
see SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (1976).
43. Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1982)).
The PRIA established the first statutory grazing fee formula. Prior to the PRIA the government had used administrative formulas, which could be changed at any time. The PRIA mandated
use of a specific formula and ended the practice of fee moratoriums in bad economic times. The
formula has not lost all flexibility, however, since its operational structure provides relief when
prices drop. The new formula evidences the general trend of "creeping regulation at the periphery"
that Coggins describes, and is one step away from the historical administrative subservience to
their client ranchers.
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1901(b) (1982) states:
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cisely. 4" The change in management under the FLPMA and the PRIA encourages a more diverse use of the public lands.46 The issues resurfaced
with the scheduled expiration of the PRIA grazing fee formula at the end of
1985."7 The increasing concerns over the public lands fueled calls for the
reform of federal grazing laws.4
Eighteen months of maneuvering failed to produce a bill acceptable to
all concerned parties. Western Republicans circulated a draft bill, entitled
the Public Rangelands Policy Amendments Act of 1985.49 The draft proposed reforms concerning a variety of public land issues, including grazing
fees, riparian preservation, experimental stewardship programs, advisory
boards and councils, and wild horses and burros.50 The Republicans did not
introduce the PRPAA, however, because they could not reach a consensus
on the many issues presented.5"
While the PRIA and the FLPMA remain in effect, the PRIA sections
pertaining to grazing fees expired on December 31, 1985.2 President Reagan, however, later extended the PRIA formula for an indefinite period by
executive order.5 3 The President set $1.35 (the 1985 fee) as the minimum
chargable fee. None of the parties involved like the current law and all want
to change it.5 4 Being an election year, it is doubtful that such sensitive issues
Congress therefore hereby establishes and reaffirms a national policy and commitment
to:

(1)

inventory and identify current public rangelands conditions and trends as part of

the inventory process required by . . . the [FLPMA] . . .

(2) manage, maintain and improve the condition of the public rangelands so that they
become as productive as feasible for all rangeland values in accordance with management
objectives and the land use planning process established pursuant to . . . the [FLPMA]

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

Id.
43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(1), (3) (1982).
The mere use of the term "multiple use" encourages a broader variety of users to utilize the federal
lands. The inclusion of multiple use committees allows the government to allocate use among
competing users and determine the most beneficial and higher valued use to the public. Sustained
yield infers productive use only from the harvest of crops or animals, but must also include nonproductive uses that benefit the user.
The ranchers resent this intrusion into their hitherto exclusive domain and remain adamantly
opposed to any extension of these twin policies. Their economic livelihood has been greatly disturbed in the last 10 years and any further disruption threatens, in their eyes, their entire world.
The PRIA states that the PRIA fee will only be applied "for the grazing years 1979 through
1985." 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982).
The active parties in the movement were conservative western ranchers. They sought to preserve
the existing fee system while appeasing conservation groups with some changes in the non-fee
sections of the federal law. The PRPAA evolved from this movement.
The draft, dated July 23, 1985, was obtained from Senator James McClure (R-ID). Among the
congressmen involved in circulating the draft bill were Rep. Ron Marlenee (R-MT), and Sens.
McClure and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY).
See PRPAA infra at appendix.
The consensus failed despite many efforts at compromise. Some congressional staffers felt that they
had produced the fairest and most balanced bill for all concerned and that after 18 months of work
no further change was possible.
See supra note 47.
Executive Order No. 12,548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985 (1986). The Executive Order repeats the PRIA fee
provisions, as stated in 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), but places a $1.35 base price as a minimum fee.
The order was signed on February 14, 1986. It resulted from extensive lobbying by top Senate
Republicans. See Reid, supra note 23, at 32.
The discontent with grazing law has been a constant factor since Congress first enacted grazing
laws. No plans exist to introduce the PRPAA. This note uses the PRPAA because the author
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will be settled in 1986."5 The positions of the rancher, the conservationminded citizen, and the agencies and bureaucrats of the various levels of
government must be examined before analyzing the strengths of the
PRPAA and proposing alternatives to reform the current system.
THE PROTAGONISTS IN THE STRUGGLE OVER
GRAZING FEES
Both conservationists and ranchers advance valid arguments in support
of their positions. However, both positions cannot co-exist in the same grazing system without some compromise. In general, the ranchers seek to
maintain the status quo, while conservationists want higher fees and other
changes in the system. State and federal bureaucrats and politicians desire
some compromise to appease the greatest number of constituents. Any solution, moreover, must reduce budget problems and not create new ecological, social and economic ills in the West. Each of these groups has different
concerns and therefore different solutions relating to the federal grazing
system.
The Ranchers
Western cattle ranchers face a difficult struggle. The rancher seeks a
living in a historically depressed industry. His difficulties include declining
land values and loan equity, increasing hay and transportation costs, and
low beef prices.56 The rancher's problems have continued despite grazing
fees that have dropped during the last five years." Permit holders generally
believe that the marginal value5 of
the land they lease from the government
8
supports its low apparent cost.
believes that together with the suggested amendments the draft bill represents the best solution to a
very difficult issue.
The pressure is on Congress because of its failure to pass the PRPAA and the President's
executive order. The executive order has already set the fees and the ranchers no longer need a new
grazing law. Furthermore, the ranchers do not have to follow any of their PRPAA concessions.
After the PRPAA failed, the conservatives shifted their attack to the President to get an extension
of the current fee. Only Congress can change the law now, and it will do so only if environmentalists and the budget conscious can generate enough pressure to do what the livestock lobby failed to
do in 1985.
55. Given the inability of Congress to settle the issue in a non-election year and its historical lack of
agreement on this issue, it is unlikely that any significant reform will be undertaken in 1986. For
overviews of the historical debates in this field, see generally A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, and P.
Foss, supra note 4.
56. See generally Reid, supra note 23; Stanfield, Cowboys and Conservationistsin Range War over Grazing Fees on Public Land, 1985 NAT'L REV. 1624. Davis, Cattlemen vs. Environmentalists. Congress
Tries for Compromise on Disputed Grazing Fee Issue, 1985 CONG. Q. 1676 (all presenting a brief
synopsis of the present state of the livestock industry).
57. An AUM is the equivalent of one cow grazing for one month. The fee is based on the number of
AUMs allocated by the government for each grazed tract. The index peaked at $2.77 per AUM in
1979 and has since declined to $1.35 per AUM in 1984. Today's fee has changed little since the
1968 fee of $1.23, although this does not take into account general inflation since that time. 1985
DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 14.
58. The essential problem with the western livestock industry is its inefficient nature. The few cattle
require immense areas to satisfy their nutritional needs-needs more easily satisfied in feed-lots,
irrigated meadows, or areas not requiring irrigation. One commentator has suggested that elimination of the federal system would have a negligible effect on the amount of beef produced in the
United States. He suggests, somewhat facetiously, that allowing these cattle to graze on highway
right of ways in the East would be more nutritious, require less space, and cost less then grazing
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To justify fees amounting to a fraction of that paid for other government
land and private grazing land, permit holders claim that specific problems
associated with using public land warrant low fees. First, ranchers lease the
land and do not receive title to it.59 Second, the rancher must tolerate other
6
uses of his pasture, including wildlife grazing,' hunting and fishing, ' logging, mining, and recreational sports. 62 Finally, a large amount of administrative business takes place in inconvenient district offices, which require
that government forms be kept and filed on both a yearly and event basis.6 3
Ranchers believe that the additional burdens associated with holding
federal grazing permits create an intangible, harrassment cost that must be
considered when comparing the actual federal fee with private grazing fees.
They include these hidden costs in determining the fair rental value for
federal land. The ranchers believe these costs equalize the facially different
private and public costs.' The ranchers conclude that a fee increase will
raise their costs above market value and place them in an inferior position
to those using private lands for forage.
Ranchers feel the current fee is justified despite its apparently low level.
Permit holders have consistently fought higher fees and sought fee formulas
to protect fragile profits. 65 They depend on the current legislation to protect
them against rapid increases in fees.66 Fear that higher fee levels will force
many of their neighbors out of business pervades the ranching communities
of the West, a fear shared by their congressmen. 67 While the ranchers sur-

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

66.
67.

cattle across millions of acres of fragile public land. P. WILD, Grazing on Public Lands, 65 SIERRA
(May/June 1985).
To a great extent this is true. The only thing preventing the end of this enormous waste of
resources and harm to public land is the political influence of the livestock lobby over Congress,
and Congress' inability to support efficient use and preservation of our common resources. Since
Congress has ignored the economic realities of ranching on public land in the West, Congress must
maintain the current programs and debate minor issues to the detriment of the larger question i.e. whether public lands ought to be leased for grazing at all.
43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(b) (1985). Permits may be lost for many reasons. See supra note 32.
Forage taken by big game animals equals two-thirds of that taken by domestic livestock. M.
CLAWSON, supra note 5, at 67. See also Coggins II, supra note 4, at 96-97.
Hunters and fishers frequently vandalize or destroy fences, gates and other improvements on the
leased land. These improvements are paid for and put in by the lessee rancher.
This would include off-road vehicle enthusiasts, target shooters, hikers, campers and other recreationalists. Nelson believes that outdoor recreationists receive an even greater subsidy in their low
cost use of the federal lands. See generally Nelson, supra note 10. See also supra note 35. Clawson
notes that these are the same persons most outraged by low grazing fee levels, yet they do not
criticize their own subsidy. M. CLAWSON, supra note 5, at 71.
Grazing lands are simply not important to the BLM when they only generate $17 million in
revenue each year while BLM mineral and timber leases generate $160 million per year. In 10
years the BLM took in $50 billion from leases of offshore oil and gas leases. This compares with an
estimated $150 million income from grazing fees over the same period, which the BLM includes in
its miscellaneous income category. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 179.
See supra note 31.
Private leasing arrangements are typically annual oral agreements, with flexible payments, no written documents, and general understandings on use, maintenance, season length, refunds and improvements. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 67-68. This contrasts sharply with public
leasing arrangements (described supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text).
A formula takes into account various price and cost changes affecting the permit holder. A
formula may also include limits on the amount of change allowed each year. This promotes stable
prices in an industry where two highly unstable factors, the weather and the futures market, control prices. A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 3.
The PRIA limits the fee change in any year to 25%. 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982).
Senator James McClure of Idaho believes that the PRPAA provisions are essential in helping the
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vived a tripling of fees between 1968 and 1975,68 they view further increases
as a threat to their industry. Unless a compromise is reached that satisfactorily addresses these economic issues, the ranchers will oppose any attempt
to alter the PRIA formula and other federal grazing legislation.6 9
The Conservationists
Conservationists view the issues in a different light. They claim that
these few ranchers occupy a sheltered niche and pay relatively little for the
privilege of grazing on public lands. 7° They seek varied uses of the national
lands, especially less debilitating uses than those caused by animal hooves
and overgrazing. 7 ' This group concludes that reducing the number of grazing animals would rehabilitate the damaged areas.7 2
current plight of the rancher. Letter from Sen. McClure to author (Oct. 1, 1985). See generally
Stanfield, supra note 56.
68. In 1968, the ranchers paid $0.33 per AUM for BLM grazing permits and $0.52 per AUM for
Forest Service permits. The 1976 fee was $1.51 per AUM for BLM land and $1.60 for Forest
Service permits. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 63. No one knows how many ranchers
will be forced into bankruptcy by higher fees. Permit holders represent only 16% of the cattle
producers in the II western states and only 8% of the cattle producers in the 16 western states. Fee
hikes will not affect all permit holders, and the adversely affected may number a few thousand
among the 1.6 million cattle ranchers in the United States. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at
3.
69. For any compromise to succeed, these legitimate concerns of the ranchers must be addressed. The
competing concerns of the conservationists and the budget conscious, however, must also be addressed. A bill in which the ranchers extend current fees while conceding other issues will suffer a
fate similar to the PRPAA and likely never be introduced.
70. Only 31,000 ranchers, representing eight percent of the ranchers in the Western states and two
percent of the ranchers nationwide, hold permits. The remaining 98% of the cattle ranchers use
feedlots or private pasture for forage. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 3-4.
The government also funds range improvements on leased public lands. While not directly
addressed in this note, some commentators believe that this also subsidizes the western rancher.
"Since ranch operators are for the most part substantially more wealthy than the average Federal
taxpayer, publicly funding range investments transfers income and wealth from those with less to
those who already have more." Nelson, supra note 10, at 53. But see Ganzel, supra note 23, at 13
("[a]mong themselves, ranchers lamenting their property values commonly joke that they are all
fools").
The PRIA appropriated at least $15 million for range improvements from 1980 to 1986, with
increased amounts thereafter. 43 U.S.C. § 1904(a) (1982). This appropriated money supplements
the percentage of the grazing fee dedicated to range rehabilitation. The PRPAA does not appropriate additional range rehabilitation funds but maintains the proportion of fee receipt distributions.
See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 5(b). For distribution percentages of collected fees, see infra note
154.
71. The BLM considers 5% of its rangeland to be in excellent condition, 31% to be good, 42% fair
and 18% poor. This would indicate that the public range is in relatively good shape compared to
the situation described by critics of the BLM. However, "fair condition" means "51-75% depletion
(severe). . .from the virgin, or climax, plant community," a great change from the land's natural
state. Therefore, 60% of the BLM's land currently has 51% or greater depletion from its natural
state. "Good" rangeland can suffer 50% depletion from its natural condition. Conditions vary
among the states. Montana had 72% of its BLM rangeland in excellent or good condition in 1984.
Colorado had only 18% in excellent or good condition and 30% in poor condition. PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 81.
72. The environmentalists seek carrying levels low enough to provide adequate forage in time of
drought. The number of domestic livestock grazing on BLM lands is two-thirds of the level in the
mid-1950s. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 5, at 68. If livestock grazing is two-thirds of what it was
and range conditions have not appreciably improved, then either a greater decrease in the number
of grazing animals is needed to protect the land, the land may be permanently damaged from
overuse in the early 1900s, or the cattle are not the problem and the number of grazing wildlife
should be reduced to help the land. See supra note 69. See also Coggins V, supra note 4, at 534-40.
Higher grazing fees generally reduce the amount of livestock grazing; however, grazing
fees have never been set high enough to test the quantities of forage that would be taken at
different price levels. Lower fees may appear to encourage overuse; however, this effect is
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The conservationists believe an alternative way to rehabilitate damaged
range is through increased fees.7" They contend that the government subsidizes fee levels far below market value.74 These environmentalists point out
that the permit holders pay $1.35 per AUM, while other nearby ranchers
pay an average of $6.87 per AUM for private grazing land," $6.53 per
AUM for federal grazing land leased by other federal agencies, 76 and between $1.43 and $14.00 per AUM for state leased land.7 7 This indicates that
other ranchers will pay more for government leases on land frequently near
or mixed among Forest Service and BLM land. 78 Environmentalists point
out that these other ranchers survive economically. Logically then, the few
ranchers holding BLM and Forest Service permits benefit from an artifically depressed fee and can adjust to increased fees, especially if the increase
occurs over a number of years.
The conservationists seek an increased awareness by the public of the
issues and input on the decisions on the policies of multiple use and sustained yield. Despite the goal of broader public participation, ranchers continue to dominate the present boards. 79 Because these are public lands,
allowing a narrow segment of the public to control the decision-making
process is improper, especially since the public lands are supposed to be
not likely because the agencies set and enforce a maximum stocking level. In addition, the
permittee's tenure encourages prudent taking of forage to avoid deterioration of the range
over time. The impact of livestock numbers on range condition and multiple-use benefits is
an area of uncertainty.
1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 45.

73. See Stanfield, supra note 56, at 1624. See also M. CLAWSON, supra note 5, at 71.
74. Coggins IV, supra note 4, at 21 n.202. "The subsidy is the difference between the fee and the price
that willing buyer would pay. The market price for the public animal unit month's (AUMs)-as
established by sales to nonpermittees-is usually three to five times the fee paid to the government." Id. The FLPMA mandates that the government receive "fair market value" for use of
grazing land. However, fair market value is not a defined term and generally depends on who
defines it. Backiel notes:
[A]dding to the confusion is the fact that statutory language and administrative policies
state that fees be both "reasonable" and that "fair market value" be attained for use of
Federal lands and resources. To some, these are contradictory standards which give rise to
differing interpretations of the purpose of grazing fees. What might be considered as "reasonable" to some range users, may well seem unreasonable to others; what might be considered "fair market value" to some, may seem unfair to others.
A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 38. So just who and how much is subsidized is a debatable proposition-a proposition debated since 1906.
75. 1985 DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 33, at 42.
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id. at 74-75.
78. The $6.53 per AUM for non-PRIA federal land includes public market costs of PRIA formula
land. This sublease rate generally averages three to five times the PRIA fee. Id. at 10. Historically,
ranchers have paid more for private land rates. In 1914, Congress determined that public grazing
in national forests cost 3.9 cents per AUM while private grazing rates averaged 11.7 cents per
AUM. Therefore, the present disparity in rates is not an unusual situation. See Appropiationsfor
Department ofAgriculturefor the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1915: Hearingson H.R. 13679 Before
the House Committee on Agriculture, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1914).
79. The FLPMA did not change the board's composition. 43 U.S.C. § 1753 (1982). The FLPMA did,
however, make the district boards optional upon the petition of the permit holders in the district,
unlike the earlier boards mandated by the Taylor Act. Id. §§ 315o-1(a), 1753(a). In addition, the
FLPMA only authorized the district board's existence until December 31, 1985. Id. § 1753(f).
These important local boards are another reason why the western ranch community pushed for
passage of the PRPAA. See infra notes 114-126 and accompanying text. The PRIA does not mention district advisory boards. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1982). Section 4(b) of the PRPAA, infra at
appendix, extends the boards for another 10 year period, a very important provision for the
ranchers.
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managed on the basis of multiple use. Public participation can introduce
new uses to the land, view current use with unprejudiced eyes and provide
balanced suggestions for policymakers. Conservationists seek these changes
to protect the public interest at the expense of a small, special interest
group. The conservation positions are reasonable but must be balanced by
the economic realities of the livestock industry and the administrative limitations of government.
Government Agencies and Bureaucrats
The third group interested in grazing fees are the various government
agencies that administer the permit structure. A large variety of bodies at
both the federal and state levels are involved in the grazing business. Excluding the BLM and the Forest Service, eleven federal agencies, forty-four
state agencies and sixty-three local governments lease grazing land in the
West.8 ° These agencies use a variety of fee systems.8 '
At the federal level, the BLM8 2 and the Forest Service 3 lease the majority of lands.8 4 These two agencies have distinct identities 5 and are
subordinate to different cabinet level departments 6 even though they often
supervise land within the same area for the same purpose. Congress exercises ultimate authority over the federal agencies but finds itself beseiged by
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 27. Among the federal agencies leasing land (and the acres
leased) are the Air Force (87,102), Army (155,492), Bureau of Indian Affairs (7,900,841), Fish and
Wildlife Service (1,987,569), National Park Service (1,606,651), and the Coast Guard (225).
Among the state land boards and education departments leasing land (and the acres leased) are
Arizona (8,775,023), Colorado (2,724,698), Montana (4,090,430), New Mexico (10,962,097),
Oklahoma (625,000), Utah (2,814,726), Washington (885,638), and Wyoming (3,614,887). Id. at
74-75.
The states use bids, negotiated fees, formulas, board decisions and auctions in their lease procedures. The federal agencies use bidding, private rates negotiated by the lessor and the PRIA
formula. Id.
The BLM administers 187 million acres in the 11 western states, used predominantly for grazing
and classified as semi-arid or arid grasslands. Coggins I, supra note 4, at 545-46.
The Forest Service administers 185.5 million acres of land, which includes both forest and range.
Most is available for grazing. Id. at 545. The total area of federal lands grazed is about 307 million
acres. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 1.
The BLM and the Forest Service own 70% of the public lands. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984,
supra note 1, at 14.
The Forest Service has traditionally been considered the more professional and scientific agency
and less susceptible to political influence. It has stronger internal policies, creating active management. The Forest Service is clearly structured, with a balance between central authority and local
flexibility. Observers consider the BLM the more politically-oriented agency. Its management is
believed less scientific and not concerned with active range management. This popular perception
does not hold true today. Recent commentators have found that BLM and Forest Service officers
have almost identical views on public land issues. See P. CULHANE, supra note 5, at 181.
The BLM and its employees have become more professional and scientific and increasingly
concerned with the condition of the public rangeland and the FLPMA policies. See Nelson, supra
note 10, at 68-70. The BLM had little planning system or integrated resource management guidelines until the 1970s, but this has changed greatly with the legislative and judically mandated land
use planning. See Coggins III, supra note 4, at 307. The BLM lacks centralized, internal controls
and delegates much authority to local districts and their administrators. Coggins II, supra note 4,
at 64-65. This allegedly allows ranchers to dominate the local advisory boards.
For a study of the political influences, the ways the two agencies have fought opposing interests
in the public lands debate, analysis of management structure, and the quality of the staffs, see P.
CULHANE, supra note 5, at 41-69, 75-105. For one person's views on the political games played by
the various participants in this debate, see generally W. VOIGHT, supra note 12.
The Forest Service falls within the Department of Agriculture while the BLM is in the Department
of the Interior.
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interest groups from both sides8 7 and factions from within Congress itself."8
A new group further confuses the traditional rancher-conservationists dispute. Some bureaucrats have seized upon a grazing fee hike as one way to
help balance the budget.8 9 The mixture of these interest groups within both
Congress and the supervising agencies has created a difficult situation for
Congress to resolve.
The federal government is not alone in its supervision of the public
lands. The states also have an interest in the grazing problem. The federal
government owns between twenty-nine and eighty-eight percent of the western states, 90 much of which is grazed pursuant to BLM and Forest Service
lease arrangements. 9 ' Each state receives a share of the fees collected for use
in those grazed areas in lieu of assesssing property taxes on the federal government. 92 Obviously the states would receive more money from increased
grazing fees. Increased fees, however, could cause economic and social
problems9 3 if the increase adversely affects ranchers. 4 In addition, all of the
western states lease grazing land. 95 The states rely to some extent on the
federal government for overall policy and follow these developments very
closely.9 6
The individual bureaucrats of the state and federal governments have
their own interests in this dispute.97 These persons serve the government
87.

88.

89.

The National Wool Growers Association, the Cattlemen's Association, State Stockmen's Associations, and the Public Lands Council all lobby on behalf of ranchers. The Sierra Club, the National
Wildlife Board, and the Wilderness Society support the conservationists. P. CULHANE, supra note
5, at 159-69.
Many congressional supporters of the ranchers are from the West, including some who ranch
themselves. Others within the administration and Congress support environmental groups opposed
to the current fee system. The strong positions taken by the disputing parties ensure that the
congressional supporters of the parties will remain divided.
The federal budget deficit was $211 billion in 1985. The BLM and Forest Service programs collected $31,634,000 in fiscal year 1982, of which $7,775,000 was deposited in the Federal Treasury.
For the expenditure of the remainder, see infra note 154. The two agencies spent $59,312,000 on
their grazing programs, resulting in a net program deficit of $27,691,000. In 1983, the program
collected $24,227,000 in fees, of which $6,056,000 was deposited in the Federal Treasury. The two
agencies spent $58,965,000 on administration, management, and planning, resulting in a program
deficit of $34,738,000. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 6. For bureaucratic calls to increase
grazing fees as a way of reducing the national deficit, see Reducing the Deficit-Spending and
Revenue Options, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 1983 REPORT TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE
BUDGET CoMMirTEES (1983). A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 39 (noting that the budget issue may
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be the distinguishing factor in the debate over the PRPAA).
The federal government owns an average of 52.2% of the western states. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS-1984, supra note 1, at 10.
Id.
The amount paid varies from 12.5% to 37.5% of the collected fees, depending on the agency and
type of use arrangement. See infra note 154. This totals several million dollars each year. 1985
DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 6. While this is a relatively small amount when applied to many
western states, the money is very important in rural counties whose income comes from grazing
livestock on federal land. Section 5(b)(l)(D) of the PRPAA maintains this allocation (see infra at
appendix).
As fees increase the less profitable livestock owners will abandon the business. This harms the
many small communities in the West and could create a new generation of ghost towns. Social
problems inevitably follow economic distress.
See supra notes 65-69.
The states use competitive bids, appraisals of fair market value, or their own formulas. The fees
collected per AUM by state land boards, education departments and wildlife agencies are consistently above the current PRIA fee and range up to $14.00 per AUM. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra
note 33, at 27-28, 74-75.
See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
"[A]s professionally trained resource managers, BLM officers have a strong commitment to the
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and, for the most part, serve the government's policies.9 8 Although bureaucrats have historically favored ranchers, 99 this situation has clearly
changed." ° State and national bureaucrats have avoided taking sides in the
current dispute despite their beliefs. These administrators are generally professional land managers."t ' The individuals may have some political interests at stake, but by and large they attempt to implement the government's
policies and manage the land in a professional manner and avoid the political struggle taking place.
The positions held by the participants in this dispute are distinct and
clearly drawn. Although each side advocates meritorious policies, the policies advocated are contradictory. 102 The conservation of natural resources
competes with the continuation of an extractive industry. The rehabilitation
of public land conflicts with the preservation of local economies and society.
Congress' inability to reconcile these differences indicates the depth of the
dispute and the difficulty in solving these long-standing issues. The PRPAA
attempted to solve these problems. Although it failed, the PRPAA sets
forth several viable proposals to solve this disagreement and lay a foundation for workable compromise.
THE PUBLIC RANGELANDS POLICY AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1985
The PRPAA was a creature of its political environment. In a time of
record budget deficits, farm and ranch foreclosures, and concern about the
environment, the PRPAA affects relatively few persons. 103 The persons affected, however, generally occupy very important positions in many rural
western communities." ° Although the small number of permit and lease

98.

99.

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.

principles of multiple-use land management and progressive conservatism." P. CULHANE, supra
note 5, at 105.
See Coggins 11, supra note 4, for a lengthy review of the power of the livestock industry over
government agencies. Professor Coggins is generally not charitable in his assessment of BLM employees and policies. See generally W. VOIGHT, supra note 12 (detailing the political struggles for
control of the Forest Service and the BLM and the struggles within the agencies for scarce budget
appropriations and grazing rights).
Many within the BLM align themselves with the ranchers. Coggins believes these persons support
red meat production, ignore public opinion, give little consideration to non-livestock uses, and
dislike broad multiple use practices in site specific areas. "[T]hey see logical, coherent management
as a drastic and fearful departure from the status quo." Coggins IV, supra note 4, at 99.
See P. CULHANE, supra note 5, at 105. Every BLM range manager interviewed by Culhane had
degrees in range management or natural resources management. Id.
Professor Coggins criticizes the BLM for its non-scientific practices and passive, decentralized
administration. He advocates merging the BLM's grazing division into the Forest Service's, creating one federal agency responsible for both timber and grazing. He considers the efficient and
scientific Forest Service to be the logical place to unify grazing management, administration and
planning. The BLM would lose most of its land but retain most of its revenue, which comes from
mining and energy. Coggins V, supra note 4, at 511-34. Coggins' sound ideas face practical political difficulties in extinguishing and reforming such a large agency with strong constituent support.
Id.
Federal laws in part cause the contradictory policies. See supra note 74.
There are about 31,000 permit and lease holders. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 3.
Culhane surveyed many western communities and found that the community leaders, many mayors and most county commissioners were livestock ranchers, as were most of those persons involved in irrigation, conservation, and water districts. These people had strong ties to community
realtors, businessmen and local government officials. P. CULHANE, supra note 5, at 159-61, 180.
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holders produce an insignificant amount of beef' °5 on a vast expanse of public land 1 6 in sparsely populated western states, their ranching activities
have an enormous impact on the economic base of the region as well as on
the citizens who desire to use the public lands for other purposes.10 7
The PRPAA attempts to reach a compromise on many of the disputed
issues. These issues include grazing fees (the primary source of dispute),
advisory boards (the second most important issue), and the less important
issues of riparian areas, wild horses and burros, and experimental stewardship programs. All of the PRPAA's provisions, however, must play some
role in the compromise needed in this field.
Grazing Fees
The most controversial section of the PRPAA is its position on grazing
fees."0 ' The PRPAA does not change the current fee formula.' 0 9 The PRIA
fee was calculated from a base value of $1.23 per AUM, which is modified
by three variables: a forage value index, a beef cattle price index, and a
prices paid index."' 0 The 1985 federal grazing fee of $1.35 per AUM stands
substantially lower than the average private grazing contract fee and the
appraised grazing rental value of the federal lands, which average about
seven dollars per AUM. 11 1 Thus, the PRPAA retains the PRIA base and
105. Only two percent of the nation's cattle producers hold permits. This represents only eight percent
of the cattle producers in the 16 western states. The West as a whole, including private and public
grazing, produces only 17% of the nation's cattle. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 3.
106. They graze about 307 million acres. Id. at 1. This is an area roughly equivalent in size to the New
England and Atlantic Coast states combined. PUBLIc LAND STATISTICS--1984, supra note 1, at 10.
107. The BLM took in $214 million in 1984. This included $153 million from timber sales and only $17
million from grazing. PUBLIc LAND STATISTICS--1984, supra note 1, at 179. Grazing fee receipts
have averaged about one percent of BLM total receipts since 1936. The percentage is similar for
Forest Service receipts. See A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 32.
108. Various articles and editorials attest that grazing fees were the most publicized segment of the draft
bill. See Stanfield, supra note 56; Davis, supra note 56, at 1676. For several newspaper editorials on
the topic, see Ranchers:Plan to raise grazingfees out of line, USA Today, Feb. 3, 1986, A8, col. 1;
A Bad Budget Example, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 31, 1986, 16, col. 1 ("Ranchers cannot be allowed to
continue to chew their cud"); Reagan must extend grazingfee formulafor public lands, Great Falls
(Mont.) Tribune, Dec. 30, 1985, 8, col. 1:
Low rates on public lands may amount to a subsidy of sorts, but . . . cattle and sheep
producers do not receive the basic price and loan supports that grain farmers enjoy. There
may be instances of overgrazing, but there are many other examples of excellent stewardship of public lands through cooperation with private ranchers.
109. The PRPAA restates the PRIA fee formula language. 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). See PRPAA, infra
at appendix, § 5(a)(l).
110. These indexes are based on annual government studies, modified by historical data from the base
period of 1964-68 and converted into index values. The Forage Value Index evaluates the market
value of the public lands. It utilizes informal surveys of cattle operators and seeks the average
rental value of private grazing lands in their area. The Beef Cattle Price Index evaluates the average annual transaction prices of cattle marketed at over 500 pounds. Based on a survey of stockyards, auctions and dealers, it excludes calves and sheep from the final price. The Prices Paid Index
weighs selected components of the National Index of Prices Paid by Farmers, a government survey. See infra note 169 (discussing index components and weighing). These survey results are
gathered locally and then averaged on a westwide basis. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at
19-24.
An alternative to a single fee would be fees for regions that display similar terrain, vegetation
and costs. A westwide formula is an average value that benefits ranchers in high cost areas and
penalizes areas where the regional fee falls below the westwide fee. The BLM has calculated regional figures for all of the proposed fee options. Any new fee arrangement must consider this
alternative method of structuring the fee calculation system. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 10. The federal lands leased for an average of $6.53 per AUM and the private lands for $6.87

1986]

Grazing Law Reform

indexes, a fact that lies at the center of the dispute over the PRPAA.
Ranchers support, and conservationists oppose, Congress' failure to
change the PRIA formula. Ranchers emphasize that grazing pressure on
the land would not decrease with higher fees. 112 They fear the economic
and social results of increased fees. Conservationists view the failure to increase fees as continuation of an unfair subsidy for a privileged few," 3
which slows range rehabilitation and decreases long-term productivity.
Conservationists believe that the PRPAA fails to address these crucial issues by ignoring the need for higher fees that can solve budget and conservation problems.
Advisory Boards and Councils
The makeup of boards and councils that administer the grazing system
constitutes the second important segment of the PRPAA. As established by
the FLPMA, these groups exist on two levels. The Secretary of Interior
creates multiple use councils to act as general advisory panels.' 14 These
councils consist of any citizen the Secretary chooses. 1 5 The second group,
district advisory boards, serve all BLM district offices and National Forest
headquarters.1 6 Although having no enforceable authority and theoretically only advising the Forest Service and the BLM on management allotment plans and the use of range betterment funds," 7 through time these
boards have become the actual decision makers in those areas."' The district grazing advisory boards include only lessees and permit holders from
that area.' Critics allege that the boards dominate the administrators and

112.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.

per AUM. Id. The PRIA formula charges about 21% of the appraised market value as determined
in 1982-83. The appraised market value equals what the federal lands would realistically lease for
in a free market system. These values vary greatly with the quality and location of the land. Id. at
45.
The 1985 Draft Report evaluated various fee alternatives and their impact on the federal government, state governments, administrative costs, and permittee impact. The report calculates that if
fees rose from the current $1.50 rate to $4.00-5.00, then herd sizes across the West would decline
three to six percent. This small reduction would only slightly reduce the overgrazing problem,
since it matters little whether 95 or 100 cattle graze a tract of land. Land requires either a significant reduction of grazing levels or regular rest periods to recover. Therefore, only greatly increased
fees will lessen stress on the land; however, such action is not a viable position of compromise.
Moderately higher fees benefit the land through additional funding for range rehabilitation and
sustained yield planning. Id. at 37-45.
Only 16% of the West's ranchers graze livestock on federal land. They represent two percent of the
1.6 million cattle producers nationwide. Id. at 3, 73-75.
The multiple use advisory councils consist of 10 to 15 members representing "various major citizens' interests concerning the problems relating to land use planning or the management of the
public lands located within the area ...." 43 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982).
The FLPMA requires one "elected official of general purpose government" on each advisory
board. 43 U.S.C. § 1739(a) (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 580k, 43 U.S.C. § 1753 (1982).
43 U.S.C. § 1753(c) (1982). The Forest Service boards must give "advice and recommendations"
on "any matter pertaining to (1) the modification of the terms, or the denial of a renewal of, or a
reduction in, a grazing permit, or (2) the establishment or modification of an individual or community allotment." 16 U.S.C. § 580k(d) (1982).
A strong criticism of federal grazing activities is that the de facto decision makers for the lands are
the advisory board leaseholders, and not the professional range administrators staffing the government bureaucracy.
The Forest Service boards must contain one wildlife representative from a state game commission
or similar body. 16 U.S.C. § 580k(3) (1982). The FLPMA sets the maximum size of these boards
at 15 persons. The lessees and permittees in the district choose the members. 43 U.S.C. § 1753(c)
(1982).
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120
abuse the system.

By limiting the number of permit holders on each council,' 2 1 the
PRPAA converts the general advisory councils into a true multi-interest
panel representing all groups interested in federal grazing lands. The
PRPAA alters the district advisory boards by including non-permit holding
representatives, requiring at least one from a private wildlife and fish group
and at least one from a similar state agency.' 22 The
PRPAA would have
23
extended these provisions for another ten years.
All of the groups in dispute over this bill generally support these board
and council changes. While the ranchers dislike relinquishing exclusive control of local boards, they would have received a ten year extension of their
existence. 124 Without the district boards, civil servants would make decisions presently made by the ranchers, something the ranchers could not
tolerate. 125 While conservationists agree the change is overdue, it is obvious
that their token representatives may have little impact
when opposed by a
1 26
majority of permit holders on each district board.
Other PRPAA Issues
The PRPAA alters federal grazing law in several other ways. The first
change creates an innovative riparian planning and funding program.127
Until the PRPAA there had been no specific efforts promoting riparian values or protecting the many streams and rivers on federal grazing land. The
120. See G. LIBECAP, supra note 37, at 53-55. The FLPMA threatened the district boards by making
them an optional part of the grazing system. The Taylor Act requires an advisory board. 43 U.S.C.
§ 315o-1 (1982). The FLPMA provided that only upon petition will advisory boards be established, and such boards had authorization only until 1985. 43 U.S.C. § 1753 (1982). Their former
function has generally been assumed by the multiple use councils, creating a temporary duplication
of government panels.
"The dismantling of the once-powerful advisory boards was testimony to the relative decline of
rancher authority over the land they grazed in the 1970's." G. LIBECAP, supra note 37, at 80-81.
See generally W. VOIGHT, supra note 12. The Secretary may now, with the aid of the new multiple
use councils, specify carrying capacity, season length, and management goals. For a list of the
members, see PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 4(c). The members shall "fully, fairly, and legitimately
represent diverse points of view and the broad range of major citizens' interests concerning the
problems relating to land use planning or the management of the public lands." Id. at § 4(c). The
PRPAA creates a council that can consider the multiple uses of these lands and advise the government on which policies best serve a sustained yield.
121. One member shall be a "domestic livestock grazing representative" and no more than one-third of
the advisory council can hold grazing permits. Id.
122. See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 4(a).
123. Id. § 4(b). The district advisory boards were scheduled to expire on December 31, 1985. The executive order extended the district boards for an indefinite period. See supra note 53.
124. Conservationists hope the additional members will help disseminate their viewpoint at the local
level and influence carrying capacity on individual allotments to create an overall reduction in land
use. See G. LIBECAP, supra note 37, at 80-82. There has been extremely little research done on the
positions and policies of the individual western rancher. To some extent, the policies are those of
the national organizations. The typical rancher seems to support land conservation efforts and
steps to maintain productivity. The ranchers must balance these considerations with the need to
provide for themselves and their families. In general, the ranchers are aware of conservation measures and, to a point, will not oppose them.
125. See supra note 53.
126. The conservation members will find themselves regularly outvoted by wide margins. They hope
that their repeated voicing of their position and a long-term movement toward lower carrying
levels would be effective.
127. Riparian refers to rivers and their immediate surroundings. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1960 (1981).
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PRPAA elevates riparian features to equal planning, development, and
management status with the other multiple use and sustained yield concerns
of the FLPMA and the PRIA.12 8 The Secretaries may designate "key riparian management areas" to protect specific riparian areas.12 9 Existing land
use plans must be amended within three years and all new planning must
integrate riparian concerns.' 30 The PRPAA funds these practices with
twenty-five percent of the collected fees.' 3 This program represents a major
achievement for the conservation movement. It creates an innovative program supported by adequate funding to protect and rehabilitate a fragile
portion of the national lands.' 3 2
The PRPAA also unifies the BLM and Forest Service planning schedules. Presently, the Forest Service must update land use plans at least every
fifteen years while the BLM has no similar requirements.' 3 3 The PRPAA
switches BLM planning to the fifteen year schedule. 34 This represents another victory for the conservation movement. The PRPAA ensures that
BLM management will utilize current planning so it may address current
concerns involving the public lands. 3 '
Two other PRPAA changes are the extension of the experimental stewardship program and the inclusion of the National Grasslands within the
PRIA. The PRIA created an experimental stewardship program which provided incentives and rewards for the improvement of range conditions by
the lessee.' 3 6 The PRPAA extended the program and established multiple
use stewardship committees 37 to study and develop the program for wider
39
use."38 The PRIA exempted the National Grasslands from its provisions. 1
The Department of Agriculture, which runs these lands, must apply differ128. The FLPMA includes "water resource . . . values" with its other general concerns. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a)(8) (1982). The PRIA cites excess saltation, reduced quantity and availability, and increased run-off and flooding as some of problems caused by damaged watersheds. Id. § 190 1(a)(3).
For the PRPAA's general policies on the riparian issue, see PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 3(a).
129. See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 3(c). The PRPAA includes appropriate criteria for determining
whether the land and water meet the program's qualifications.
130. Id. § 3(d)-(e).
131. Id. § 5(b). This would have amounted to just over $6 million if the program had been in effect in
1983. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
132. The ranchers accepted this program as part of the final PRPAA draft bill and it is in the best
interest of the public lands for the next grazing bill to include it.
133. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982). The FLPMA requires the BLM to "when appropriate, revise land use
plans ....
" Id.
134. See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 2.
135. The BLM has ignored and delayed land use planning, which generally makes management less
scientific and less effective. Some stockmen criticize the great expansion of planning for the public
lands. They claim the great expense, uncertain value, increased administrative budgets and additional paperwork and planners make the program inefficient. Because the land changes so little
most tracts do not require new plans every 15 years. Some feel that planning for planning's sake
balloons administrative costs and creates the deficits. These persons think that those interested in
budget overruns should seek a more austere government dedicated to the essential administrative
needs of the program and enforcement of the existing rules.
136. 43 U.S.C. § 1908 (1982). The incentives include payment by the government of 50% of the grazing
fees for the Experimental Stewardship area. Congress was to receive the results by December 31,
1985, for recommendations and further legislation. Id. § 1908(b).
137. The stewardship program encourages active private management by the permit holder. This program is generally considered fairly successful and all of the parties concerned approve of the
program.
138. See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 6(a)-(b).
139. 43 U.S.C. § 1907 (1982).
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ent standards than it uses on its Forest Service lands. This change helps
integrate the national grazing system and avoid some duplication within the
Department of Agriculture.
THE PRPAA: A TRANSITION IN FEDERAL GRAZING LAW
The first step in changing federal grazing law should be to adopt the
PRPAA as it is now written. The bill represents a compromise between the
ranchers' need for a continuing grazing formula and renewal of advisory
boards and the conservationists' need to solidify their gains on the advisory
boards, riparian relief, and planning requirements. It represents the best
solution to the unresolved grazing issues for several reasons even though the
PRPAA is not the perfect solution.
First, the PRPAA represents a relatively balanced compromise between
potential harm to ranchers caused by the higher fees and constructive use
and rehabilitation of the public range." The compromise allows the ranchers to maintain the current formula. 4 ' The livestock industry also receives
an extension of the district advisory committees, although the PRPAA requires two non-permit holders on each committee. 142 In exchange for these
provisions, the environmental movement received three things, the most
important being the riparian program and funding. Conservationists also
negotiated the BLM's switch in planning schedules as well as appointments
and the changes to the advisory boards and councils.' 4 3 The ranchers were
willing to make these concessions in the PRPAA so long as the current fee
formula was maintained. 1 " While the western ranchers may not accept a
bill raising fees, non-western congressmen may support its passage. The environmental lobby demands some increase in fees, which explains the failure of the PRPAA draft bill.' 4 5 Congress, however, must amend the
PRPAA to address the budget issue before it can be passed into law. While
a dubious solution to the overgrazing and rancher hardship issues, increased fees present an answer to the budget problem.
140. This author feels that the ranchers gave up less than the conservation movement, and that while
the western Republicans wrote a bill they could sell to the livestock industry, they did not write a
bill they could sell to the portions of Congress concerned with environmental issues and budget
deficits.
141. The ranchers appear willing to give away many things to maintain their control over the grazing
system. The thing they apparently do not want to compromise is the fee level. Therefore, if a
reasonable and moderate fee hike could be agreed to, it would appear to be relatively simple to pass
a comprehensive package to reform the federal grazing system. Enactment of most of the PRPAA
would represent a substantial step in the direction of much needed reform.
142. See supra note 122.
143. These changes provide for increased supervision of the public lands by a larger variety of groups
interested in the public lands.
144. The 1985 Draft Report suggests that while moderate fee increases would force some ranchers to
leave their land, the "typical" permittee would not have to discontinue operations until the fee
reached $8.85 per AUM. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 41. This indicates that ranchers
may have more room to compromise than is believed. Fee increase of two to three dollars would
not have a significant impact on the ranchers. There would, however, be some impact if fees rose
above that amount, including bankruptcy of ranchers and bank failures across the West. Congress
must weigh the competing issues here and resolve them to best serve society as a whole.
145. Even a small fee increase would be a gesture by the ranchers that they recognize the conservation
position. If a small fee hike were included the conservation community would be much more
amenable to the PRPAA.
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The livestock owners present a strong social, economic, and fiscal case
for supporting the PRPAA's continuation of the current PRIA fee system.
While declining fees indicate to some that ranchers can easily absorb fee
increases, the decline in grazing fees since 1981 was caused by falling beef
prices, thereby reducing the corresponding fee index. 146 Because the index
is based on the rancher's costs, the fees only drop when the rancher's ability
to pay also declines.
Increased access to district boards and multiple use councils, an increased amount of land use planning, 147 and the riparian programs are all
reasons for the environmentalists to support the PRPAA. All of these are
payoffs from the biggest victory of the environmental movement: the mid1970s policy changes promoting multiple use and sustained yield of the
public lands. Continued access to the decision-making process will slowly
shift the public lands from the exclusive province of the cattle rancher to
public use as envisioned by the conservation community. If the fees are not
raised, the concessions gained in the PRPAA will be partial steps to the
multiple use goal. 148 Moreover, because of the budget constraints, the
PRPAA could be introduced with the fee hike included in it.
The PRPAA fails because it does not address the budget problem. 4 9
Simply put, the grazing programs cost the government more money to run
than they generate in revenue. 150 For every $1.35 collected from the ranchers the federal government spends about $3.50. 151 Current fiscal consciousness will prevent grazing reform if the legislation fails to address this issue.
Therefore, while the public should support the PRPAA for the changes it
brings to other issues, Congress must amend the PRPAA fee provisions to a
level that will resolve the budget problems without harming the rancher.
Several fee alternatives proposed by the BLM and Forest Service would
generate $75 to $85 million in additional fees,' 52 and eliminate the pro146. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 19-23. One can argue that the fee index functions too well.
While some may argue for a fixed fee, this ignores economic reality and the ranchers ability to pay
in different economic situations. In good years, the indexes rise, as does the rancher's ability to pay.
In tougher times, however, the ranchers lack extra capital to cover fixed fee costs. The formula
compensates for changing prices and promotes stability in a volatile industry.
147. One major problem with these studies is that they may eventually cost $200 million. This dwarfs
the annual administrative budget for the grazing lands of around $30 million. Nelson, supra note
10, at 63-70. Section 2 of the PRPAA, infra at appendix, continues the extensive and detailed
planning process pursuant to multiple use and sustained yield goals. Another problem was the lack
of uniform definitions-what one group considered poor grazing land may have meant something
else to a different group in a distant state which had a different climate and vegetation. See Coggins
II, supra note 4, at 87-88.
148. The conservationists could still compromise on the PRPAA. It may be feasible to accept the
PRPAA as written, even if it includes no fee changes. If the conservationists offered the PRPAA as
a bill, the western congressmen would likely jump at the chance to bring home a grazing bill that
included no fee changes.
149. Budget problems were also raised in 1914, 1920, 1946, 1947, 1951, 1968 and the 1970s. See A.
BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 3, 7, 11, 13,15, 17-18.
150. The BLM and the Forest Service had costs of $58.9 million for planning, management and range
improvements in 1983. The two agencies collected $24.2 million in grazing fees, creating a program deficit of $34.7 million in 1983. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
151. Id.
152. The Modified PRIA, Livestock Price, and Modified Market Value formulas would have generated
between $75 and $85 million in 1983, which exceeds the $60 million in administrative costs. These
alternative formula incomes compare to the $24 million actually generated by the PRIA formula.
Id. at 37-38.
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gram's internal deficit. Other proposed fee alternatives would generate
lesser amounts and only reduce the program's deficit. 5 3 Only a portion of
the receipts, however, go directly into the federal treasury.1 54 The PRPAA
continues to allocate the bulk of the collected fees to range rehabilitation
and riparian areas.1 55 State governments would also receive a share of the
money, but must balance this against the problems caused by disruptions to
the local economies. 15 6 Although dramatic fee increases could significantly
decrease the program's internal deficit, grossly higher fees would destroy
many ranchers and force marginally profitable permittees out of ranching.1 57 The average rancher can, however, maintain profitable use of the
public lands until the fee reaches about $9.00 per AUM.158 The proposed
alternatives only raise the fee to about $5.00 per AUM, about half of what
would cause the typical permit holder great trouble. Therefore, the proposed alternatives would have a beneficial fiscal impact while causing only
slight harm to the average rancher.' 5 9
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE PRPAA:
ALTERNATIVE FEES
While the PRPAA solves most of the disputed issues, one key issue
must be resolved in order to facilitate acceptance of the bill by all concerned
parties. The PRPAA should increase grazing fees slightly, an increase of
between $1.00 and $2.00 per AUM. Given the potentially serious economic
impacts of significant increases in the fees, the first step toward returning
the fees to a fair level should be a token increase. Both conservationists and
153. The Nonfee Costs formula would have generated $46 million in revenue, thereby only lessening the
deficit. Id.
154. Fee distribution depends on the collecting agency and the type of use arrangement. The Forest
Service allocates 50% of receipts to the range betterment fund, 25% to the United States treasury,
and 25% to the states in which the fee was collected. The PRPAA does not change this. The BLM
collects funds from its more numerous permits and allocates 50% for range betterment, 12.5% to
the states, and 37.5% to the treasury. The PRPAA changes this by only allocating 12.5% to the
treasury and devoting the remaining 25% to the new riparian program. For lease arrangements,
the BLM gives 50% to the state and 50% to the range betterment fund. The PRPAA does not
change this. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315i, 1751(a)-(b) (1982). See PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 5(b)(1).
155. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315i, 1751(a)-(b) (1982). PRPAA, infra at appendix, § 5(b)(l).
156. Fee increases would cause immediate expansion of local economies as new government spending
offset the rancher's losses. The livestock industry, however, would not receive the funds, which
would benefit construction, finance, insurance, real estate and trades. Thus, the additional government spending fails to support the group hurt most by increased fees. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra
note 33, at 44.
157. The government calculates that permittee returns over cash costs would decline $21 million to $73
million, or a decrease of $667 to $2355 per permit holder, depending on the fee alternative chosen.
Given the marginal profits associated with western ranching, these increases represent significant
hazards for the ranchers. Id. at 40.
158. The 1985 Draft Report states that only significant increases in fees would have a great impact on
the western livestock industry. Fees would have to reach $8.85 per AUM before the "typical permittee" would stop using federal lands. While permittees of lower profit levels might become bankrupt, these would number a few thousand out of over 1.5 million cattle producers in the United
States. Id. at 41.
159. Id. Environmentalists approve of increased range rehabilitation funds and decreased herd size.
When combined with the PRPAA's advisory board and riparian area changes, the conservationoriented will find much to support in the revised PRPAA. State governments will receive more
money and avoid catastrophic effects on local economies. Moreover, the ranchers will suffer less
than under proposed fee alternatives put forward by the federal government. Federal permit value
will remain at a fraction of its assessed market value, a point that the ranchers should not forget.
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ranchers will likely accept token increases. The ranchers would not accept
significant increases in the fees, and no fee change, as the PRPAA currently
advocates, is unacceptable to conservationists. This change also addresses
the important issue of budget deficits, which the current PRPAA ignores.
As the system stands after President Reagan's February 14, 1986 executive order, the PRIA formula is indefinitely extended and must charge a
minimum fee of $1.35.16 The Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior can
continue to set the fees but only within the congressionally mandated PRIA
formula and the Reagan base price. Congress must determine the formula
necessary to calculate the higher fees. Of the five alternatives proposed by
the Draft Report,' 6' the Nonfee (Differential) Costs system formula is the
best option. Alternatively, Congress should consider adding a surcharge to
the current PRIA formula as a solution if the interested parties cannot
agree to an alternative fee.
The Nonfee Costs Alternative
The best way to raise fees is the Nonfee (Differential) Costs system. The
160. Executive Order No. 12,548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985 (1986).
161. In the 1985 Draft Report, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior proposed a Modified PRIA
formula, a Nonfee (Differential) Costs formula, a Livestock Price formula, a Modified Market
Value formula, and a Competitive Bid formula.
The Modified PRIA system uses the same indexes as the PRIA, but weighs factors within one
of the three indexes in a different way and uses appraised values for its base. These changes are
located infra note 169. If this alternative had been in use, fees from 1980 to 1984 would have been
between $5.48 and $4.31 per AUM, or two to three times their actual value of $2.36 to $1.37 per
AUM. Of the alternative formulas not discussed in the text, this is the best alternative. It would be
fairly easy to implement and would eliminate the budget deficit. In the Modified PRIA, the fees
relate directly to relevant agricultural prices and are based upon the entire ranch economy. The
Modified PRIA does, however, place fees a little too high and would have more severe effects than
the Nonfee Costs system.
The second alternative, Nonfee Costs, is discussed in the text. The fee from this formula would
have ranged from $2.66 to $3.35 per AUM, for 1980 to 1984. See infra notes 162-75 and accompanying text for discussion.
The third proposed alternative bases fees on beef prices. This Livestock Price formula sets fees
at 20% of the price received for calves. Single variable fees are vulnerable, however, to isolated
market shifts and do not reflect the broad spectrum of factors that go into the ranch economy.
From 1980 to 1984 the beef price alternative would have created fees ranging from $4.08 to $5.06
per AUM.
The Modified Market Value system, the fourth option, compares the private land lease rate
with appraised animal base value. This alternative also depends on a single variable, the grazing
lease market. It would have generated fees from $4.31 to $4.82 per AUM during 1980 to 1984.
The fifth proposed system relies on auctioning grazing tracts to the ranchers. While the other
systems relate to historical base values and yearly economic factors, the Competitive Bid system
places the lease in the hands of the highest valued user. Some minimum bid requirement would
exist, probably the appraised market value of the tract.
This program would have the highest administrative cost, about three times that of the PRIA
formula, because of the individual bidding process. The other alternatives also increase administrative costs, but not to the degree of the competitive bid system. Increased program costs would
partially negate increased revenues from an alternative formula. In addition, under the Competitive Bid alternative only one person would bid for many of the allotments. The lack of competition
because of access problems and collusion could result in many ranchers paying the minimum
amount, thus frustrating the purpose behind the competing bids. 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note
33, at 19-45. Competitive Bid systems had been discussed as early as 1906 but were not adopted
because of their instability and benefits to the larger, wealthier ranchers. See A. BACKIEL, supra
note 13, at 3.
One way to mitigate harm caused by increased fees would be to implement fee increases over
several grazing years. An immediate increase of $3.00 per AUM would be much more difficult to
swallow than a three dollar increase over three or six years.
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PRIA utilized a base rate modified by grazing lease rates and the ranchers'
ability to pay. 162 The Nonfee Costs system changes the formula by attempting to include other costs that affect the ranchers in their use of the public
range.1 63 The Nonfee Costs formula increases the PRIA base value and
modifies the PRIA variable indexes.'" The nonfee base price would have
been $2.86 in 1983,165 an increase from the PRIA base of $1.23.166 The
formula uses a base value modified by forage value, beef prices, and price
paid indexes. 167 The base period updates the PRIA base period to account
for general inflation.' 6 8 The indexes have been subtly altered by the BLM
and the Forest Service to provide for more accurate reflections of economic
activity. 169 The Nonfee Costs formula offered in this note bases its formula
on the years 1980-1984. If this alternative had been in use, the fees would
162. A. BACKIEL, supra note 13, at 33.
163. 1985 DRAFr REPORT, supra note 33, at 30.
164. The following should replace the PRIA grazing fee formula, located at 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982),
and replace § 5(a)(1) of the PRPAA, infra at appendix.
For the grazing years 1987 through 1997, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior shall
charge the fee for domestic livestock grazing on the public rangelands which Congress finds
represents the economic value of the use of the land to the user, and under which Congress
finds fair market value for public grazing equals the $2.86 base value established by the
1983 update of the 1966 Western Grazing Livestock Survey multiplied by the result of the
Forage Value Index (based on an annual AUM weighed survey of private grazing land lease
rates for the 16 western states, 1980-1984 = 100) multiplied by the Combined Index (Beef
Cattle Price Index [based on existing beef cattle prices weighed by AUM's for the 16 Western states, 1980-1984 = 100] divided by the National Prices Paid Index [weighed to reflect
all production costs (both farm and non-farm origin) for typical cow-calf operation in the
16 western states, 1980-1984 = 100]) and divided by 100: Provided, That the annual increase or decrease in such fee for any year shall be limited to not more than plus or minus
25 per centum of the previous year's fee.
The formula looks like this:
Fee = Appraised base value X (FVI X (BCPI/PPI)
100
1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 30. The 25% change limit ensures it will take several
years for the full effect of the fee increase to be felt by ranchers, and allows them several years to
assimilate the increase.
165. The formula determines base value by subtracting the nonfee costs value of $2.09 from the private
grazing land lease rate of the lowest priced western region. The formula discounts the lease rate by
10% because most ranchers using private land receive that deduction for advance payment of fees.
Id. at 30-31.
166. The PRIA base ($1.23) was calculated by subtracting the nonfee (differential) costs ($0.55) from
the estimated private land lease rate in the 1966 Western Livestock Grazing Survey of Private
Grazing Land Lease Rates ($1.79). Id. at 17.
167. See supra note 110 for the PRIA's original definitions of these terms. See supra note 164 for the
proposed definitions.
168. The livestock industry experienced a 380% increase in nonfee costs since the 1966 Western Livestock Grazing Survey. This increase inflated the PRIA nonfee cost differential from $0.55 to $2.09,
which the Nonfee Costs formula proposed in this note adopts. See supra note 165. 1985 DRAFT
REPORT, supra note 33, at 30-31.
169. The Nonfee Costs alternative proposed by this note changes neither the Forage Value Index nor
the Beef Cattle Price Index. The Prices Paid Index was altered to include several factors not embraced by the PRIA formula. The PRIA index contains the following, adjusted by the weights
included parenthetically: fuels and energy (14.5), farm and motor supplies (12.0), autos and trucks
(4.5), tractors and self-propelled machinery (4.5), other machinery (12.0), building and fencing
material (14.5), farm services (18.0), interest (6.0), and farm wage rates (14.0). 1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 24.
The proposed Input Costs Index reweighs the formula to include production costs of farm
origin, such as fertilizer and feed. The factors, adjusted by their relative weights in parenthesis, are:
feed (42.6), fuels and energy (6.7), tractors and self-propelled machinery (7.2), building and fencing
materials (4.8), farm services (4.9), interest (19.0), taxes and insurance (6.3), and farm wage rates
(8.5). Id. If changing the components of the PRIA formula were the only step taken by Congress
then the fee would rise from $1.40 per AUM to $2.85 per AUM. Id. at 23. The President's execu-
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have ranged from $3.35 in 1980 to $2.63 in 1985.170
The nonfee system would approximately double existing fees and reduce
the program deficit by about two-thirds.' 7 ' Permit holders face decreased
return above cost of about $667 per rancher, 72 a significant but not unreasonable amount. Herd size would decline by about three percent. 73 The
ranchers facing financial problems would be those overwhelmingly depen74
dent on the use of federal lands, primarily those in the desert southwest.'
Federal "worst-case" scenarios of the counties most dependent on federal
lands suggest that tripling
fees would cause a two percent reduction in the
75
counties' net incomes.
Because the nonfee alternative does not eliminate the program deficit, it
is not a perfect alternative. It is, however, a position that all parties can
accept. By switching to a nonfee cost alternative, an increase in fees would
have some impact on the livestock industry's profits and production, and
also reduce the program deficit. The alternative formula provides additional
fees for range and riparian rehabilition. While the deficit is not completly
eradicated, the Nonfee Costs alternative represents a substantial step toward that end that should be supported as an amendment to the reintroduced PRPAA.
Permanent Surcharge Alternative
Congress could also raise grazing fees through a permanent surcharge to
the base value of the fee. The government should add a one dollar surcharge
to the current fee, raising the base value of the PRIA from $1.23 to
$2.23. 176 This would be easy to administer under the current procedures
and forms. 1 7 7 The surcharge would increase revenue almost to the level of a

170.
171.
172.

173.
174.

175.

176.

177.

tive order maintains the PRIA Prices Paid Index. Executive Order No. 12,548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985
§ 2(d) (1986).
1985 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 33, at 31.
In 1983 the Nonfee (Differential) Costs formula would have generated $46.8 million on costs of
$60 million, leaving a deficit of $13.2 million. The actual 1983 PRIA income was $24.3 million on
costs of $60 million, for a deficit of $35.7 million. Id. at 37-38.
The 1985 Draft Report calculated the adverse cost to ranchers as the decrease in income above
costs (profit) as a result of the implementation of the five proposed fee alternatives. The Nonfee
Costs alternative projected reductions of returns above cost at about $21 million. By distributing
the $21 million loss among the 31,000 holders each loses about $667. Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
The southwestern states depend most on federal lands for forage, with Arizona the most dependent
state with 60% of the cattlemen holding permits. Only Nevada, Utah, Arizona and New Mexico
rely on federal land for more than 25% of their forage. For the northern Rockies and the West
Coast, increases in capital costs (higher interest rates) have a greater impact on the livestock industry than fee increases. Id. at 42, 49, 53-54.
Each state had one county selected as the one most dependent on federal lands. Average loss in
total county net income with a fee of four dollars was 2.1%, with a variation of 5.7% to 0.1%. A
5% decline in total county net income would create severe economic hardship. While increased
government spending offsets this slightly, non-ranch sectors of the economy receive the benefit, and
not those hurt by the higher fees. Id. at 54-55.
Section 6(a) of the PRIA, located at 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), should be modified by replacing
"under which Congress finds fair market value for public grazing equals the $1.23 base established
by the 1966 Western Livestock Grazing Survey multiplied ....
" with "under which Congress
finds the fair market value for public grazing equals $2.23 multiplied ....
"
Congress would only have to change the dollar amount on all forms. A simple sticker for the forms
and administrative announcements would probably suffice to effectuate the change.
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nonfee cost alternative' 7 8 and have slightly less adverse impact on ranchers'
costs, profits and herd sizes.' 79 As an intermediate alternative between the
more radical modified market value, modified-PRIA and competitive bid
fee alternatives proposed in the 1985 Draft Report, the surcharge provides a
viable compromise. 80
While neither the nonfee cost nor the dollar surcharge achieve solvent
budgets,8 they do represent universally fair positions for all the concerned
parties. 1'
CONCLUSION
The federal grazing system needs reform. There has been significant
change since the mid-1970s, change that has agitated the ranch industry
into attempts to entrench their way of life while the conservation movement
has simultaneously attempted to continue further reform of the public
lands. The Public Rangelands Policy Amendments Act of 1985 sought to
preserve key features of the federal program while providing minor change
to increase public involvement and protect the public lands. Congress produced several compromises, but could not resolve the dispute and the bill
was never introduced. A vital need exists for legislation addressing the
problems of budget deficits. The legislation must not, however, upset the
delicate economic balance that exists in the West.
Congress should pass the PRPAA after amending the existing grazing
fee fomula to a Nonfee (Differential) Costs formula. Congress could, alternatively, impose a permanent surcharge on the current fee while debating
further changes in federal grazing law. The PRPAA would then represent a
balanced solution to the differences between the interested parties. The bill
as drafted embodies most of the needed compromises. If the ranchers accept
some moderate fee hike, implemented over several years, then the last and
most important compromise could be resolved and the budget issue solved
as well. The PRPAA, if amended, would address the problems in the fed178. Revenue in 1985 would have been about $40 million, enough to reduce the deficit by a significant
amount.
179.
No figures exist on the exact impact of this increase. Because the increase is slightly less than
the non-fee cost alternative, the dollar surcharge would have slightly less effect. For example, if total county net income would drop 2.1% with a fee of $4.00, a fee of about $2.50
would only cause a decrease in total county net income of about 1.5%.
180. The surcharge could probably be accomplished through executive order, similar to President Reagan's executive order that put a minimum price on the fee formula. The President could mandate
a $2.35 base instead of a $1.35 base. Given the discretionary power held by the Secretaries in
charge of the program in setting fees, the President could easily raise fees a slight amount until
Congress can agree on a permanent funding formula.
181. Environmentalists approve of increased range rehabilitation funds and decreased herd size. When
combined with the PRPAA's advisory board changes, the conservation-oriented will find much to
support in the revised PRPAA. State governments will receive more money and avoid catastrophic effects on local economies. Moreover, the ranchers will suffer less than under fee alternatives proposed by the government. Federal permit value would also remain a fraction of its
assessed market value.
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eral grazing system. Congress should pass the PRPAA as the first step in
the long term reform of the federal grazing system.
Timothy K. Borchers*

*

B.A., University of Montana, 1984; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1987.
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APPENDIX
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Public Rangelands Policy Amendments Act of 1986."
LAND USE PLANNING AND MONITORING
Sec. 2. Section 202 (a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. 1712 (a))
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 202 (a)(l) The Secretary shall with public involvement and consistent with the terms
and conditions of this Act and other applicable law, develop, maintain, and from time to
time when he finds conditions in a tract or area have significantly changed (but at least every
fifteen years) revise, land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public
lands. Land use plans shall be developed for all areas of the public lands regardless of
whether such lands previously have been classified, withdrawn, set aside or otherwise designated for one or more uses. Land use plans shall fully incorporate and reflect the standards
and guidelines contained in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, other applicable requirements or provisions of this Act, and the requirements of other laws applicable to the public
lands. The Secretary shall attempt to complete such incorporation for all units of the public
lands no later than December 31, 1991. Until such time as a unit of the public lands is
managed under land use plans developed in accordance with this Act, the management of
such unit may continue under existing land use plans or management direction.
(2) As part of the inventory required pursuant to section 201 of this Act and the development, maintenance and revision of land use plans the Secretary shall establish a program
to closely monitor range conditions and other values of the public lands. The Secretary shall
include in each new (or revised) plan a report detailing range conditions, trends, and changes
in range conditions and other values that have occurred during the period covered by the
previous plan (or existing plan), as well as a description of longer term trends and
conditions.
RIPARIAN AREAS
Sec. 3 (a) As an integrated and equal consideration in developing, maintaining and revising
land use plans for the public lands pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (as amended), and land and resource management plans for the National Forest System
pursuant to the Forest and Rangeland Renewal Resources Planning Act of 1974 as amended
by the National Forest Management Act of 1976, the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, respectively, shall inventory, identify and consider riparian values in addition to, and in
conjunction with, their other integrated planning requirements and responsibilities for plans
covering areas of the public rangelands.
(b) Each land use or land and resource management plan shall identify and incorporate
such provisions, projects, actions plans and schedules as are necessary to maintain, protect,
restore or improve, and monitor, riparian values in areas covered by the plan to promptly
achieve a healthy and productive ecological and range condition. Allotment management
plans shall include such terms or conditions as are necessary to maintain, protect, restore, or
improve riparian values pursuant to the land use or land and resource management plan.
(c) Where the Secretary concerned determines in the land use or land and resource management planning process that riparian values in a given area are unsatisfactory and that
special management emphasis or increased funding are necessary to maintain, restore or
improve existing or potential riparian values or areas, he may designate the area as a "key
riparian management area." In determining whether to designate an area as a "key riparian
management area," the Secretary concerned shall be guided by the following criteria:
(1) whether the area has especially important values for water production or retention;
flood, salinity or erosion control; critical or sensitive plant fish and wildlife habitat; critical
or sensitive plants species, communities or vegetative associations; and/or scenic, recreational or other important values which merit special management emphasis or funding;
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(2) whether riparian values are so degraded that significant environmental damage is
occuring and more conventional riparian habitat improvement efforts, projects or levels of
funding are unlikely to be sufficient to promptly achieve desired improvement results; and
(3) whether existing or potential riparian values are likely to be maximized by making
public investments in the area pursuant to the authority of subparagraph 5(b)(1)(B) of this
Act.
(d) If upon enactment of this Act, initial land use plans for the public lands pursuant to the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (as amended) or initial land and resource management plans for national forest lands pursuant to the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1984 . . .the requirements of this section for the inventorying,
identification, monitoring, protection and enhancement of riparian values and areas shall be
met by adopting amendments (as opposed to revisions) of any such plans within 3 years of
the date of enactment of this Act.

GRAZING BOARDS AND COUNCILS
Sec. 4. (a) Section 403 (c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1753) is amended by adding the following new sentence at the end thereof:
Each board shall also have one wildlife representative from the State agency or public body
having jurisdiction over wildlife and fish in the area concerned, and at least one wildlife
representative to be appointed by the Secretary concerned in close consultation with, and
from the ranks of, such individuals, groups, organizations and associations as are involved
with wildlife and fish management issues in the area administered by the office concerned.
(b) Section 403 (f) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 is hereby
amended by changing "1985" to "1995."
(c) Section 309 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1739)
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 309 (a) For at least each Bureau district office and for such other administrative units
as he may deem advisable, the Secretary shall establish multiple-use advisory councils (hereinafter referred to as "advisory councils") of not less than ten and not more than fifteen
members appointed by him. Such councils shall be balanced and members shall be appointed
and certified by the Secretary to fully, fairly and legitimately represent diverse points of view
and the broad range of major citizens interests concerning the problems relating to land use
planning or the management of the public lands located within the area for which an advisory council is established. Advisory council members shall be appointed without reference
to political party affiliation, (and the Secretary shall so certify), in accordance with rules
prescribed by the Secretary, Provided, however, That:
(2) each advisory council shall contain at least the following members, who shall be
appointed by the Secretary in close consultation and coordination with, and from the ranks
of, such individuals, groups, organizations and associations as are generally recognized to be
concerned with, and shall be certified by the Secretary to represent, the particular multiple
use and/or land use described:
i. a representative from the State agency or public body having jurisdiction over wildlife
and fish in the area concerned;
ii. a wildlife and/or fish representative;
iii. a motorized recreation representative;
iv. an environmental protection representative;
v. a soil and water conservation representative;
vi. a domestic livestock grazing representative;
vii. an elected official of general purpose government serving the people of the area for
which an advisory council is established;
viii. where significant resources exist within the area, a representative of the locatable
minerals industry;

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 13:216

ix. where significant resources exist within the area, a representative concerned with
cultural, paleontological, archeological or historical preservation and protection; and
x. where significant resources exist within the area, a representative of the leasable minerals industry.
(3) no more than one third of the members of an advisory council at any given time
shall be holders of either federal domestic livestock grazing permits or leases or mineral
permits or leases.
(b) Each advisory council established by the Secretary under this section shall meet at
least once a year. Such meetings may be called by the Secretary or by majority vote of the
council.
(c) Members of advisory councils shall serve without pay, except travel and per diem
will be paid each member for meetings called by the Secretary, and for up to 3 meetings per
year called by majority vote of the council.
(d) An advisory council may furnish advice to the Secretary with respect to (1) land use
planning, classification, retention, management and disposal of the public lands within the
area for which the advisory council is established; (2) conflict resolution; (3) such other
matters as may be assigned to it by the Secretary; and shall also review and comment to the
Secretary on the advice and recommendations of the grazing advisory board within the area
for which the council is established.

GRAZING FEES AND RANGE IMPROVEMENT FUNDING
Sec. 5. (a)(1) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior shall charge the fee for domestic
livestock grazing on the public rangelands which equals the $1.23 base established by the
1966 Western Livestock Grazing Survey multiplied by the result of the Forage Value Index
(computed annually from data supplied by the Economic Research Service) added to the
Combined Index (Beef Cattle Price Index minus the Price Paid Index) and divided by 100:
(Provided, that the annual increase or decrease in such fee for any given year shall be limited
to not more than plus or minus 25 percentum of the previous year's fee).
(2) The Secretaries shall promulgate regulations providing for collection of grazing fees at
the end of a grazing season. Such season end billing may be used at the discretion of the
Secretaries as an incentive to grazing permittees or lessees for accelerating or maintaining
the improvement of range conditions on public rangelands.
(b) Subsections 401 (b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (as amended) are hereby amended to read as follows:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law, beginning in fiscal year 1987, all
moneys received by the United States as fees for domestic livestock grazing on the public
lands . . . [is] to be disposed of as follows:

A. Except as provided in the last clause of subparagraph (D) of this subsection, fifty per
centum of all said moneys shall be used for a diverse mix of range improvements, one half of
which is authorized to be appropriated and made available for use in the district, region, or
national forest from which such moneys were derived. . . for the purpose of on-the-ground
range rehabilitation, protection, and improvements on such lands, and the remaining onehalf shall be used for on-the-ground range rehabilitation . . . as the Secretary concerned
directs. Any funds so appropriated shall be in addition to any other appropriations made to
the respective Secretary for planning and administration of the range betterment program
and for other range management. Such rehabilitation, protection, and improvements shall
include a diverse mix of all forms of range improvements, as such improvements are defined
in section 3(f) of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (43 U.S.C. 1902), and, as
the respective Secretary may direct after consultation with the grazing advisory boards, multiple-use advisory coucils, Experimental Stewardship Committees and other interested
parties.
B. Twenty-five per centum of all said moneys is authorized to be appropriated and used
specifically for on-the-ground range improvement projects (and maintenance thereof) and
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conservation efforts designed for the benefit of such key riparian management areas as the
Secretaries may designate pursuant to section 3 of this Act.
C. Twelve and one half per centum of all said moneys is authorized to be appropriated
and used for on-the-ground range improvements (and maintenance thereof) and conservation efforts designed specifically for the benefit of fish and wildlife populations or habitat.
D. Twelve and one half per centum of all said moneys shall be paid at the end of each
fiscal year to the State in which the grazing lands, district, region or national forest producing such moneys are situated, to be expended as the State legislature of such State may
prescribe for the benefit of the county or counties in which the grazing lands, district, region
or national forest are situated; Provided, further, That for moneys collected under the authority of section 15 of the Taylor Grazing Act (43 U.S.C. 315m) 50 per centum (as opposed
to 12 'A per centum) shall be paid to the States in accordance with this subparagraph with
such additional per centum derived from the moneys otherwise allocated by subparagraphs
(B) and (C) of this subsection: Provided, further, That for moneys collected from National
Forests in the sixteen contiguous western States under the provisions of this section, an
additional amount equivalent to twelve and one half per centum of all said moneys shall be
paid to the State or county (as provided by existing law) in which the national forest lands
producing such moneys are situated, with such additional per centum to be derived from the
moneys otherwise allocated by subparagraph (c) of this subsection.

EXPERIMENTAL STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM
Sec. 6. (a) The Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, individually or jointly, are
hereby authorized to continue to develop and implement an Experimental Stewardship Program as set forth in Section 12 of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 . . .
Provided, however, That such program shall henceforth be subject to the following
provisions:
(1) for each area of the public rangelands administered pursuant to the Experimental
Stewardship Program the Secretary or Secretaries shall establish a multiple-use Stewardship
Committee;
(2) each Stewardship Committee shall be composed of a representative of the Secretary
or Secretaries and such members as the Secretary or Secretaries deem appropiate, but shall,
to the maximum extent practicable, include individuals or representatives of state and local
government and groups or organizations concerned with all multiple uses in the area, including individuals concerned with wildlife, fisheries and environmental protection;
(3) in conjunction with the goal of exploring innovative grazing management policies
and systems which might provide incentives to improving range conditions, Stewardship
Committees should endeavor to recommend solutions to natural resource conflicts and develop proposals to improve multiple-use resource management in the area concerned;
(4) areas administered pursuant to the Experimental Stewardship Program shall be
closely monitored by the Secretary or Secretaries to determine whether such program is
resulting in improved range conditions, better multiple-use management, better conflict resolution and/or other improvements in land management or land conditions.
(b) In addition to the report to Congress on the Experimental Stewardship Program required by subsection 12(b) of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, the Secretary or Secretaries shall [every five years] . . . report to Congress on the results of the
Experimental Stewardship Program and provide recommendations to Congress for expanding, modifying, terminating or otherwise amending the program. Such report shall also
discuss the interrelationship between Stewardship Committees, grazing advisory boards and
multiple use advisory councils with a view toward promoting coordination and cooperation
between such panels and recommending elimination of any duplicative functions or
procedures.
WILD HORSES AND BURROS
[Section 7 of the draft bill has been omitted from this appendix.]
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SUBLEASING
Sec. 8. A grazing permittee or lessee shall not unilaterally make a temporary reassignment
of the grazing privileges granted under a term grazing permit or lease. In those cases where
the Secretary concerned determines that temporary reassignment of grazing privileges authorized by term grazing permit or lease from the permit or lease holder to a third party is in
the best interest of sound range management, such temporary reassignment may be authorized for periods not to exceed 1 year without further authorization; Provided, That, the
dollar equivalent of value, in excess of the grazing fee established and paid to the United
States Government, received by the holder of a term grazing permit or lease as compensation
for allowing domestic livestock that are not owned or legally controlled by the permittee or
lessee of record to graze on public lands, shall be paid to the Secretary by the permittee or
lessee, and disposed of a[s] provided for by Section 401(b) of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701):
Provided further that if the dollar value prescribed above is not paid to the Secretary, the
grazing permit or lease shall be cancelled: Provided further, that nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to affect either the right of the owner of base property or livestock to sell or lease
said base property or livestock, or the authority of the Secretary, in his discretion, to reassign
the permit or lease to the purchaser or lessee.
MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 9. (b) Section 11 of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 is hereby repealed. Notwithstanding any other provision of law the provisions of this Act and the Public
Rangelands Improvement Act shall apply to the National Grasslands.

